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A view from india
ANWAR ALAM
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
ABSTRACT This article attempts to explain why and how the Indian state has
been successful in managing the militant form of Islamic fundamentalism in India,
despite favourable internal and external conditions for such militancy. Internally, it
includes such factors as the relative material and cultural deprivation of Indian
Muslims, the context of Hindutava and the communal riots, and externally, the
Islamic radical movements abroad. Varied literatures have emphasized these factors
for the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic militancy across the Muslim
world. However, India has not witnessed large-scale Islamic militancy, despite the
growth in Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The article offers a theoretical
perspective that takes into consideration the interplay of the nation-building
process, the constitutional framework of minority rights, the doctrine of Indian secu-
larism, and the democratic political process. This interplay explains the absence of
large-scale militancy and violence, either on the part of Islamic fundamentalist
groups/institutions or the Muslim population in India.
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INTRODUCTION
Of all the religious fundamentalist movements that have arisen in recent
times, Islamic fundamentalism has attracted a great deal of attention in the
media, academia and the governmental sector and also among the wider
public for two specific reasons. The first is its connection with the violence
in the name of Islam, often degenerating into the form of terrorism that
culminated in 9/11. Second, it is looked upon not merely as a threat to
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western interests in the oil-producing region of the Muslim world, but also
as a destabilizing force to the western-dominated global order. For these
reasons, the western powers have primarily been concerned with Islamic
fundamentalist movements in the regions of the Middle East and North
Africa (or in such states as Pakistan and Indonesia where they have vital
strategic or political interest) and have often approved the repressive
policies of the authoritarian regimes in the region in order to curb the
menace of Islamic militancy. It is within this context that this article seeks
to draw attention to the ‘political management’ of Islamic fundamentalism
in the Indian setting. It attempts to explain why (and how) the Indian state
has been successful in managing the ‘menace of Islamic fundamentalism’,
without causing any serious damage to the body politic or the social fabric
of the nation and to see whether India offers any fresh perspective while
dealing with the issue of Islamic fundamentalism in particular and the inte-
gration of Muslim minorities1 in general.
The scope of this article is limited in two senses. First, it does not cover
Islamic militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. For, unlike the outside percep-
tion, the violence connected with the Islamic fundamentalist groups in
Jammu and Kashmir does not reflect the collective aspirations of Indian
Muslims. The detailed description of ‘indifference’ and sometimes even the
‘hostile’ relationship between the two is out of place here. Second, the
multiple factors that have been examined in this article to explain the lack
of militancy or violence among Indian Muslims or dominant Islamic funda-
mentalist groups are not applicable to the regions of the Punjab, Kashmir
and north-east, where a considerable amount of armed militancy has existed
in recent years. Unlike in these regions, Muslims generally lack such
regional concentration elsewhere and are consequently dispersed all over
India. It is thus hard to equate the accumulated grievances of Muslim
communities in India with the cause of sub-nationalism or secessionism that
exists among many groups in the Punjab, Kashmir and north-east.
Moreover, Muslim’s sense of identification with India is historical, unlike
Kashmir and many of the north-eastern states that became part of India
through a ‘specific treaty’.
FUNDAMENTALISM: SOME CLARIFICATIONS
Attempts to define ‘fundamentalism’ have not met much success and it
remains a contested term. The term ‘fundamentalist’ was first used with
reference to a group of US Protestant churches that arose in the 1920s
that advocated a literalist Biblical position. However, what began as a
laudatory term in the 1920s was pronounced a bad word by James Barr, a
Biblical scholar, half a century later, suggestive of ‘narrowness’, ‘bigotry’,
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‘obscurantism’ and ‘sectarianism’ (Barr, 1978: 2). Today it is this meaning
of religious fundamentalism that has gained currency, particularly among
liberal-modernists. As such, the term ‘fundamentalism’ is used in a pejora-
tive sense and it denotes a state of mind that is static, retrogressive,
conservative, extremist, and prone to violence. Bruce Lawrence defines
fundamentalism as ‘the affirmation of religious authority as holistic and
absolute, admitting of neither criticism nor reduction; it is expressed
through the collective demand that specific creedal and ethical dictates
derived from the scriptures be publicly recognized and legally enforced’
(Lawrence, 1989: 78). T.N. Madan provides a comprehensive description of
fundamentalism that, according to him, comprises the following elements:
1 affirmation of the inspiration, final authority, inerrancy, and transparency of
scripture as the source of belief, knowledge, morals, and manners;
2 recognition of the reactive character of fundamentalism: it is not an original
impulse as, for example, orthodoxy is, but a reaction to a percieved threat or
crisis;
3 intolerance of dissent, implying monoply over truth;
4 cultural critique, that is the idea that all is not well with social or community
life as lived in a particular time;
5 appeal to tradition, but in a selective manner that establishes a meaningful
relationship between the past and the present, redefining or even inventing
tradition in the process;
6 capture of political power and remodelling of the state for the achievment of
the stated objectives; and
7 charismatic leadership.
(Madan, 1997: 27–8)2
Islamic fundamentalism shares all these attributes of fundamentalism, as
enumerated by Madan. Where it differs from all other religious fundamen-
talist groups is in its claim and emphasis that the laws of Islam are univer-
sally applicable to all types of human groups and societies and for all times.
Hence it attempts to reconstruct the ‘Islamic Order’, that was established
during the period of the Prophet and first four Caliphs,3 in modern times,
not only within Muslim societies but all over the world, by all means, includ-
ing violent ones. Islamic fundamentalists of all shades consider Islam as a
‘complete ideological system’, and not merely as a matter of faith. It is seen
as having been in constant competition with all other ideological systems
prevailing in the world (for example, Socialism, Communism, Capitalism,
Nationalism, Democracy, other religious ideologies, Paganism) since its
birth and its eventual victory is considered guaranteed. Islamic doctrines of
Sharia, Jihad, Jahilliya, Dawa and Umma4 have come to constitute the ideo-
logical features of Islamic fundamentalist movements despite the fact that
it is not a monolithic phenomenon.
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For many scholars, the term ‘fundamentalism’, being western in origin
and without any equivalence in Arabic lexicography, suffers from prejudices
and negativity and hence it cannot comprehend the ‘multidimensional’
features of Islamic movements. Rather, they prefer such terms as ‘Islamism’,
‘revivalism’, ‘resurgence’, ‘re-awakening’ and ‘reform and renewal’ in order
to confer a positive meaning to the contemporary Islamic movements and
to situate them within the context of Islamic historiography (Euben,1999:
16–18; Zeidan, 2003: 62–92, 72–5).
Notwithstanding the ‘selectivity’ and ‘negativity’ associated with the
term ‘fundamentalism’, I prefer this term over any other terms and its
applicability to Islamic movements is because it helps to comprehend both
the ideational and practical action of Islamic movements. At a broader
ideational level, fundamentalism refers to contemporary religio-political
movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the
community, excavating and reinterpreting these foundations for application
to the contemporary social and political world. In terms of practical action,
Islamic fundamentalism suffers from dogmatism and apologeticism, and
past glorification. It also discriminates against social groups such as women,
rejects the principle of pluralism, and resists democratic changes.
NATURE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS IN INDIA
Within the broader meaning of fundamentalism as stated above, the most
important Islamic fundamentalists groups and institutions in India are
Jamaet-i-Islami Hind (JIH), Tabligi Jamait (TH), Student Islamic Move-
ments of India (SIMI), Jamaet (JUH), Dar-ul-Ulum at Deoband, Darrul-
Ulum Nadwatul Ulama at Lukhnow, and the All India Muslim Personal
Law Board (AIMPLB).5 Unlike Islamic movements in other parts of the
Muslim world, militancy, violence and terrorism are not a characteristic of
Islamic fundamentalist groups or organizations in India, save the funda-
mentalist groups in Jammu and Kashmir highlighted earlier. Thus, the few
violent incidents that have attracted global attention, including terrorist
attacks on Parliament, Delhi (13 December, 2001), the Akshardham temple,
Gandhinagar, Gujrat (24 September 2002), the American Centre, Kolkota,
West Bengal(22 January 2002), the twin bomb explosion at Gateway of
India and Zaveri Bazar in Mumbai (25 August 2003) and the makeshift
Ram temple at Ayodha (5 July 2005) are primarily the result of Islamic
militant groups from Jammu and Kashmir such as, Hijbule Mujhaddin,
Lasker-e-Tyaba, Hurkutl Mujahiddin, Jaise-e- Muhammad, Harkutl ul-
Jehadi e-Islami. Of the 49,369 Indian fatalities between 1994 and 2004 (due
to terrorism), 30,915 occurred in Jammu and Kashmir, 13,604 in the North-
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East, 175 in Punjab, and 4675 were caused by Left extremism (South Asia
Terroism Portal, 1994–2004).
Indeed the rise of Hindutva forces has led many commentators to say
that it will give rise to Islamic militancy in India that has so far been limited
to the conflict in Kashmir (Wright, 2004: 38–48,). The few cases where
Muslims and Islamic groups outside Jammu and Kashmir were allegedly
found to be involved in violent activities either in an individual capacity or
organizationally, or in collaboration with Jammu and Kashmir-based
Islamic militant groups, were the cases relating to the Serial Bombing in
Mumbai (March 1993), Coimbatore (1998) bomb blasts and the bomb blast
at Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazzar, Mumbai, the commercial capital of
India (August 2003). The Islamic militant groups that were allegedly found
to be indulging in these terrorist activities are the SIMI, al-Umma in Tamil
Nadu, and Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS, now the People’s Democratic Party)
in Kerela. The Indian Union and state governments have imposed a ban
upon them under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Reflecting on the Muslim militancy in the wake of the rise of Hindutava,
particularly in the post-Babri masjid demolition period, Kanti Bajpai noted,
‘the right-wing Muslim violence has so far been rather limited, although the
Mumbai (1993) and Coimbatore (1998) bomb blasts were amongst the
bloodiest incidents of Muslim militancy outside Kashmir’ (Bajpai, 2002: 21).
During his recent visit to USA, the Indian Prime Minister in a CNN inter-
view emphatically stated: Though India has 150 million Muslims, ‘not one
has been found to have joined the ranks of Al Qaeda or participated in the
activities of the Taliban’ (The Telegraph, 2005). Scholars working on Islamic
fundamentalism in India have also observed its non-violent dimension and
peripheral impact (Ahmed, 2004: 6; Agwani, 1986: 130; Sikand, 2004: 180).
CONDITIONS OF INDIAN MUSLIMS
The absence of large-scale violence either on the part of Islamic fundamen-
talist groups or the Muslim masses is significant when one looks at the
contemporary situation of Indian Muslims. First, the relative material and
cultural deprivation of Muslims in post-colonial India has been well
documented by various governmental and non-governmental surveys and
scholarly works (Momin, 2004; National Sample Survey Organization, 1997,
2001; Razzack and Gumber, 2000; Shariff,1999; The Gopal Singh Panel
Report, 1983). Thus, according to a recent report on India, 43 percent of
Muslims compared to 27 per cent of Christians and 39 percent of Hindus
live below the poverty line (Shariff, 1999: 12). The contrast between
Muslims and other Indian social groups becomes even more apparent in
urban India, where a comparatively large number of Muslims live. In urban
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areas, a majority of Muslims are self-employed (53.4 percent) in compari-
son to 36 percent amongst Hindus. The self-employed category for the
Muslims included, by and large, low-status occupations such as cobbler,
rickshaw-puller, small artisan and so on (Razzack and Gumber, 2000: 11).
In addition to these socioeconomic variables, Muslims also suffer from
acute under-representation in the political sphere. The percentage of
Muslim parliamentary members has varied roughly from the lowest (4.45
percent) in the 1962 elections to the highest (9.04) percent in the 1980
election since 1950 (Momin, 2004: 60). Many writers emphatically believe
that discriminatory practices contributed to Muslims being the hewers of
wood and drawers of water. As a prominent historian of modern India,
Mushirul Hasan, noted: ‘Equality of opportunity guaranteed by the Consti-
tution has largely proved to be a mirage in practice. Muslim India suffers
from discrimination in access to public employment, to higher education or
to career promotion opportunities, to public credit, to industrial and trade
licensing (Hasan, 1997: 61). It is notable in this context that literature high-
lighting social, political and economic deprivation as the basis for the
development of Islamic militancy across the Muslim world are extensive
(Ansari, 1984: 123–44; Arjomand, 1988; Ayubi, 1991; Dekmejian, 1995;
Fischer, 1982; Chalk, 2002; Hafez, 2000; Munson, 1986).
Second, the very context of the Hindu Right in India does pose a threat
to the identity of religious minority – whether real or perceived. A glance
over the reporting content of various Muslim newspapers, statements of
Muslim political leaders and social and religious activists, particularly in the
aftermath of Babri Masjid demolition (1992) and the Gujrat Carnage
(2003), confirms the ‘threat perception’ of the Muslim community. The
threat perception to the Muslim/Islamic identity was further confirmed
during the course of a massive Muslim mobilization, demanding the consti-
tutional protection of Muslim Personal Law, that was witnessed during the
mid 1980s and 1990s in the wake of a Supreme Court Judgement over the
Shaha Bano case6 and the demand of the Hindu right for a Uniform Civil
Code as given under Article 44 of the Indian constitution. This threat
perception was most aptly expressed by JUH: ‘the demand [for a code] is
tantamount to a fundamental departure from the position that, in the
present day situation where the Muslim community is deeply entangled in
a struggle for the search and safeguard of its self-identity, it is only personal
law that can be a permanent guarantee of its preservation’ (quoted in
Chandhoke, 2005: 230). For the same reason, the AIMPLB, in a recently
concluded convention, has demanded either deletion of Article 44 or
exemption of Muslims from the purview of this article (Khan, 2006).
Third, geographically, India is close to what is considered the centres of
Islamic militancy – Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Arab world. There
is no doubt that the impact of the radical Islamic movement abroad was
also felt among a certain quarter of Indian Muslims and Islamic groups.
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Thus, in the wake of 9/11, SIMI was found distributing a large number of
posters and cassettes in support of Al-Qaeda, hailing Osama Bin Laden as
‘true mujahid’ and Taliban and Muslim supporters were exhorted to
‘trample over infidels’ in many parts of the state of Uttar Pradesh’ (Sikand,
2004: 190). There is a considerable literature that emphasizes the trans-
national sources and linkages of Islamic militancy (Fuller, 2003; Katz, 2004;
Pipes, 2002).
THEMATIC QUESTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
Given, thus, these favourable internal and external conditions, and in
conjunction with the historical traditions of Islamic fundamentalist move-
ments ranging from the Shah Walliullah school to the development of
Jamat-i-Islami and Tabiliqi Jammat with their global network, it has been
expected that militant Islamic fundamentalism would provide a congenial
ground for growth among Indian Muslims. However, it has failed to
materialize beyond the limited, alleged cases of Islamic militancy in India
indicated above. How does one explain the peripheral impact of Islamic
fundamentalism or the large-scale absence of any growth of Islamic mili-
tancy in India? Why have the Muslim communities in general not reacted
violently to their growing marginalization in Indian society?
It seems that there are multiple factors that are at work in Indian society,
which, to a large extent, deter the development of militancy among Indian
Muslims and the Islamic fundamentalist organizations. These factors can be
analysed under the sub-headings that follow.
State’s repressive and anti-terrorist measures
Most governments undertake repressive and anti-terrorist measures to deal
with these kinds of threats. In the Indian context, some of the important
legislative Acts and Ordinances are the National Security Act, 1980,
Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, the Anti Hijacking
Act, 1982, the Religious Institution (Prevention of Misuse) Ordinance, 1988,
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, and the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (now repealed in view of its gross
misuse). The ‘success’ of this policy is generally seen in terms of a signifi-
cant decline of Sikh militancy in the Punjab, Islamic militancy in Jammu and
Kashmir, tribal insurgency in the parts of the North-Eastern states, and left
extremism, what is called ‘Naxal Violence’, in many parts of India. It is also
considered a useful deterrent against the possible development of Islamic
militancy in India. With specific reference to the Muslim community, the
policy is marked by increasing surveillance over the activities of Islamic
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institutions and organizations, arbitrary arrest of the ‘suspected’ Muslims
and outlawing the Islamic organizations for their alleged indulgence in any
violent activities and related alleged linkages with terrorist groups. In
particular, the Hindu right during the 1990s projected the madrassas,7
schools of traditional Islamic learning, as hotbeds of terrorism. Some of the
governmental measures in this regard include the police raid on the
premises of Nadwat ul-Ulama, in Lucknow (1995), a proposal to set up a
committee to bring all madarassas under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Human Resources Development in the name of the ‘modernization’ of
madarassas (2000), a law to regulate and monitor foreign funding of
madrassas (2002), and the requirement of prior permission of district
administrations for building new mosques and madarassas (2003). Though
a trend across the globe indicates that these types of repressive policies
have not been successful in eliminating the phenomenon of militancy,
nonetheless they do play an effective role in arresting the growth of
militancy.
Indian Islam and cultural tradition of India
A second major explanation for the lack of effective Islamic militancy in
India points to the very character of the Indian Islamic or syncretistic
cultural tradition of India (Ahmad, 1964; Ahmad, 1981; Khan: 1988;
Mujeeb: 1985; Roy: 1983). In this narrative, it is generally conceded that
Indian Islam is historical Islam and there exists a very close proximity
between Indian Muslims and Indian Hindus across cultural lines, which also
reduces the likelihood of Islamic militancy in India. As put by Assayag:
This is obvious because Hinduism and Islam, as they were practised until
recently, continue to show a great deal of flexibility and a spirit of
accommodation in their mutual relations. In fact, they display an understanding
that is infinitely richer than the limited sectarian approach adopted by
dogmatic, fundamentalist and neo-traditionalist circles on both sides. (Assayag,
2004: 54)
Reflecting on the peripheralization of Islamic fundamentalist groups, M.S.
Agwani noted that:
this is because of the incompatibility of a number of fundamentalist doctrines
with the beliefs and practices of what one might call popular Islam [in India].
Over the centuries, the latter has accommodated, among other things, saint
worship, belief in an aura of divinity about Prophet Muhammad, and devotional
music, into the social and religious life of the Indian Muslim community. The
fundamentalists frown upon all these and condemn them as heresies imbibed
from Hinduism. (Agwani, 1986: 130–1)
In a similar way, Imtiaz Ahmad has pointed to the eclectic and plural nature
of Indian Islam as the reason for the lack of a militant form of Islamic
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fundamentalism in India (Ahmad, 1995, 2005). According to him, the
persistence of pluralism of belief and practices within Islam in India has two
implications. First, it goes to show that the unity and integrity of Islam as a
world religion is not axiomatic or given, but instead is achieved through a
complex interaction between codes derived through Islamic scriptures as
well as from the exigencies of living in differing ecological, social and
cultural and political environments. Second, as a practised faith, Islam is far
more pluralist than the extreme degree of reification commonly attributed
to it (Ahmad, 1995: 25).
While the critics (Ahmad, 1964; Das, 1984; Eaton, 1993; Robinson, 1983)
have pointed out the fragility of this romanticized construction of Indian
society and, as such, doubt the existence of such reality in the context of the
recurrent Hindu–Muslim conflict; nevertheless, the plural and multiple
identities of Islam in India provides a structural limitation for the growth
of militant Islamic fundamentalism.
The framework of political democracy
The third, and perhaps the most important, explanation refers to the ‘frame-
work of political democracy’ as the causative factor for the persistence or
absence of violent activities among Muslim social groups. Mumtaz Ahmad,
with reference to the Jamaet-i-Islami in Pakistan, found the persistence of
a ‘British legacy of constitutional democracy’, despite the continuance of
military rule, as a significant factor for the absence of large-scale violence
on the part of Jamaet-i-Islami in Pakistan (Ahmad, 1991: 500). He noted:
‘It is usually the repressive policies of governments and the total absence
of freedom to pursue normal political activities that tend to drive religious
and other political groups to radicalism and violent methods of change’
(Ahmad, 1991: 500). Hafez, in a significant comparative study on the issue
of violence in Muslim populated regions around the world, also concluded
that it is not ‘material deprivation’, but ‘absolute authoritarianism’ and the
‘denial of access to state’ that are the two crucial variables that explain
the persistence or development of violent activities in Muslim-populated
regions (Hafez, 2004). Therefore, he calls for the adoption of what he refers
to as the ‘political process perspective’ to deal effectively with the issue of
violence, particularly in Muslim countries. In general, the lack of political
democracy in many developing countries has been considered the major
cause for the development of religious fundamentalism, particularly in the
Muslim world.
It is generally recognized that that the prevalence of political democracy
in India has acted as a powerful deterrent against the spread of Islamic
militancy among Indian Muslims. Nevertheless, India has encountered the
development of Islamic militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, Sikh militancy in
Punjab and tribal insurgency in parts of the north-east of India, despite the
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fact that a modicum of democratic political space and process has always
existed in post-colonial India, including in these regions, except for the brief
period from 1973 to 1977. It also fails to explain the rise of militant Hindu
nationalism and the persistence of ‘left extremism’ with its anti-state violent
legacy in India. Further, this framework does not help in understanding the
increasing rate of violent activities, including the ‘phenomenon of suicide
bombing’, among Muslims in different parts of western Europe – a region
with a strong foundation of civil society and democratic polity.
Together with these three factors, it seems that a holistic explanation for the
questions that were raised at the beginning of this article lies in the phil-
osophy and practical policies of the Indian state. This is manifested in four
interrelated areas: the nation-building process, the constitutional provision
of minority rights, the doctrine of secularism, and the democratic political
process.
NATION, STATE AND POLITICAL PROCESS IN INDIA
The west European model of a singular, monolithic, homogenized nation
state remains ‘the ideal, perfect model’ to be emulated in other parts of the
world. The Indian Constitution aimed to usher in a similarly homogenized
society and nation state by incorporating provisions such as the Uniform
Civil Code and the promotion of the Hindi language. However, unlike
Europe, where brutal elimination of diversity marked the growth of the
present nation-state structure, the Indian state set out to realize the same
goal through the course of a ‘moderate’ nation-building process, based on
principles of consensus and accommodation.
The most noticeable feature of this process is the unwillingness to articu-
late a core set of values or beliefs of the nation (Mitra, 2001: 5). Thus, unlike
in neighbouring Pakistan (where Islam is the raison d’être of Pakistan
national identity), Bangladesh (where the 1975 coup in Bangladesh
removed secularism from the core values of the constitution) or Sri Lanka
(where post-independence changes such as the democratic induction of the
‘Sinhala only’ policy form the core value of the nation), right from the
outset the Constitution of India did not define the core values of the
nation.8 Consequently, the attempt to establish Hindi as the national
language during the 1950s became an open invitation to sociocultural
groups to assert their differences as the opening gambit in the oncoming
negotiation of their status within the new republic. The Congress Party,
based on a political culture of consensus, acquiesced in these developments
and committed itself to the carving of a regional state on the basis of linguis-
tic identity – a process further expanded to include ‘tribal’ (north-eastern
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States, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh) and other ethnic-cultural identities
(Goa and Uttaranchal). Commenting on this process of nation building in
India, Dipanker Gupta wrote: ‘This however took courage, statesmanship,
and a disregard for western textbook notions of the ideal nation-state’
(Gupta, 2000: 240). It was argued that India would be better governed as a
democracy if democracy functioned in the languages and culture of its
people.
This lack of an articulated set of core values of Indian nationhood guided
the state to pursue the line of a ‘moderate’ and ‘cautious’ nation-building
process, based on the principles of multiculturalism and federalism, while
also helping in the smooth accommodation of various regional, cultural and
religious aspirations and identity at the national level (Bhattacharya, 2003:
151–64). It also saved the Indian state from facing a situation such as in
France, where the state refused to concede to the religious demands of
Muslim immigrants with respect to wearing the headscarf in public schools
on the basis that such a concession amounted to undermining the heritage
and identity of the French nation. Furthermore, the declining rate of armed
militancy in the parts of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and the north-east
indicates that India has a better record in dealing and negotiating with the
claims of groups advocating the cause of religious-ethnic nationalism. Thus,
in comparison to other multicultural, federal nation states, such as the erst-
while Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which have politically
disintegrated, India as a nation has maintained its territorial integrity
without any serious current or future sign of secessionism.
Constitutional framework and minority rights
The Indian Constitution provides protection to minority communities in
two ways. The first is derived from the principle of non-discrimination,
which is enshrined under the Chapter of Fundamental Rights (Article
14–30). Article 15(1) reads thus: ‘The state shall not discriminate against any
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them’. And Article 16 suggests: ‘no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be
ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment of
office under the state’. Clause 2 of article 29 provides that: ‘no citizen shall
be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the
state or receiving aid out of the state funds on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, language, or any of them’.
The principle of non-discrimination, though important, is not enough for
the protection of minority rights. Hence the Constitution lays down certain
specific collective cultural rights to be enjoyed by members of religious and
linguistic minorities alone, usually referred to as ‘minority rights’.9 Thus
Article 29(1) states: ‘Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of
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India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script, or culture of its
own shall have the right to conserve the same’. Article 30(1) stipulates: ‘All
minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice’ and Article
30(2) provides that: ‘The State shall not, in granting aid to educational insti-
tutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that
it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or
language. Besides these articles, the Constitution of India also contains
special provisions for the education of linguistic minorities. Article 347 of
the Constitution states: ‘On a demand being made in that behalf the
President may, if he is satisfied that a substantial proportion of the popu-
lation of a State desire the use of any such language, shall also be officially
recognized throughout that State or any part thereof for such purpose as
he may specify’ (Mahajan, 1998: 212).10 The constitution also allows persons
to submit their petitions for the redress of grievances to the state in any
language (Article: 350).
Thus, the overall objective of the above constitutional provisions is
clearly to do with the protection of the distinctive identities of the linguis-
tic and religious minorities of the country. It is interesting to note here that
while the Constitution placed limited obligation on the state in this regard,
the scope of minority rights was gradually expanded, partly due to the
judiciary’s innovative interpretation of these provisions. Referring to
Article 29(1), the Supreme Court declared: ‘This right is more or less
“absolute”, “unqualified” and “positive” and includes even the citizens’
“right to agitate for its protection”’ (Wadhwa, 1975: 98). In a famous judge-
ment connected with Article 30, the Indian Supreme Court declared that:
‘The minorities, quite understandably, regard it as essential that the
education of their children should be in accordance with the teachings of
their religion and they hold, quite honestly, that such an education cannot
be obtained in ordinary schools designed for all the members of the public,
but can only be versed in the trends of their religion and in the tradition of
their culture.11 Of late, the government of India has taken measures to
establish an institution to enforce these constitutional provisions. Accord-
ingly, the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 was passed by the
Indian parliament to monitor the working of the constitutional safeguards
in union and state laws.
The most important symbol that has come to be identified as a part of
the package of minority rights in India, from a Muslim point of view, is the
issue of protection of Muslim Personal Law or Shariat law. Muslim Personal
law is derived from the system of personal laws, or what is called ‘legal
pluralism’ that prevails in Indian society. The doctrine of legal pluralism lays
down that every community is entitled to live in accordance with their
respective religiously prescribed laws in matters of things ‘personal’, such
as marriage, divorce, adoption, inheritance, succession, etc., while the rest,
ALAM ● POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
including commercial and criminal matters, will be governed by a unified
framework of secular law. Thus, in legal cases involving Hindus, Christians,
Muslims or Parsees, matters defined as ‘personal’ are administered by
religious laws (Galanter et al., 2001: 274). Galanter has denoted this system
of personal laws as ‘principle eclecticism’ (Galanter, 1984: 567) that holds
constitutional recognition as ‘laws in force’ (Mathew, 1998: 15) and is
considered vital by many for the survival of India’s unity and integrity
(Mansfield, 1993: 139–77).
In the context of personal laws, what is important to note here is that
the Muslim community is increasingly being seen by a wide spectrum of
‘political’ commentators as the ‘only community’ to be governed by their
personal law, while the rest of the India is governed within the framework
of secular law. There are two specific reasons that underlie the emergence
of this misconceived, though pervasive, political perception: First, since the
enactment of the Shariat Act, 1937 the Muslim Personal Law has remained
intact without undergoing a process of reform, either from within or
without. On the other hand, the Hindu counterpart has undergone a series
of reforms during the 1950s, in which it has become codified in a manner
similar to general law (Austin, 2001: 15). The various reformed laws12 were
denominated as the Hindu Code and ascribed a broadened definition,
according to which the term ‘Hindu’ was expanded to incorporate
Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. As a consequence, the Hindu Code came to
apply to the overwhelming majority of Indian citizens. The codification and
widened scope of Hindu personal law seemed to detach it from issues of
Hindu identity and Hinduism. Through its similarity with general law, it
appeared as if it had been released from particularity. Second, the decline
of political secularism and the effective campaign of the Hindu Right
launched during the 1980s and 1990s against the Muslim community further
pushed the community to strongly identify with the conservative interpret-
ations of Islam.
DOCTRINE OF SECULARISM AND INDIAN MUSLIMS
The doctrine of Indian secularism, in combination with the constitutional
protection of minority rights, structures the relationship between Muslims
and the Indian nation state. The constitutional provisions that underpin the
secularity of the Indian state are Articles 25, 26, 27 and 28. Article 25(1)
grants the ‘freedom of conscience’ and ‘free profession, practice and
propagation of religion’ to all citizens. Article 26 confers the right upon
the members of a religious group to ‘manage religious affairs, establish
institutions and acquire movable and immovable property for religious and
charitable purposes’. Article 27 debars the state from levying a tax upon
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citizens to promote any particular religion, while Article 28 prohibits the
impartation of any religious instruction in any educational institution
wholly maintained out of state funds. In addition to these constitutional
provisions, the non-adoption of any religion by the Indian state further
buttresses its secular character.
A close reading of these constitutional provisions and an observation of
the secular practices of the Indian state point towards the three distinct
features of Indian secularism that are significant for the integration of
minority communities, particularly Muslims. First, it de-recognizes, if not
rejects, the principle of the strict religious neutrality of the state in favour
of the principle of the ‘relational neutrality’ of the state (Bader, 2003:
265–94). This relational neutrality of the Indian state has been maintained
by way of avoiding any constitutional definition of secularism13 and the
adoption of the kind of operative definition of secularism (Sarva Dharam
Sambhav) that neither endorses the American model of secularism in terms
of complete separation of religion and politics (constitutionally speaking, if
not in political practice) nor the European model of secularism, save
France, that recognizes the varying forms of associationship of religion and
state at a constitutional level. Clarifying the meaning of secularism, H.V.
Kamath, a prominent member of the Indian Constituent Assembly, has
stated: ‘The State represents all the people who live in its territories, and,
therefore it can not afford to identify itself with any particular section of
the population. . . . We have certainly declared that India should be a
Secular state. But . . . a secular state is neither a Godless State nor an
irreligious, nor an anti-religious, state’ (quoted in Madan, 1997: 244).
Second, the Indian state not only underlines the principle of non-
discrimination, but also proclaims equality of religions in the public realm,
along with the equality to practise religion in that arena (Mahajhan, 1998:
69). Just three years before his death, Nehru remarked: ‘We talk about a
secular state in India. It is perhaps not very easy to find a good word in
Hindi for “secular”. Some people think it means something opposed to
religion. That obviously is not correct. . . . It is a state which honours all
faiths equally and gives them equal opportunities’ (quoted in Madan, 2000:
243).
Third, the state provides a degree of associational religious freedom and
communal autonomy that is required in particular for religious minorities,
if only to protect them from ‘intrusive interference’ by states and majority
religions.
Most minority communities, particularly the Muslims, see their collective
well-being as inextricably linked to the above moderate version of Indian
secularism that takes into consideration the protection of both the physical
as well as the cultural and religious aspects of their life. Hence, among the
spectrum of secular political formations, Muslims’ preferred choice has
mostly been the centrist parties, such as the Congress, that adhere to this
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moderate version of secularism as against the radical communist parties
that advocate secularism in terms of complete separation of religion from
politics. Thus, unlike its counterpart in Pakistan, the JIH, the most important
Islamic fundamentalist organization in India and founder of Political Islam
in South Asia, supports the idea of a secular state for its ‘utilitarian expedi-
ency’ (Ahmad,1991: 505). For the same reason, most Muslim/Islamic
organizations, while reacting to communal riots,14 also accuse the govern-
ment of the day as violating or deviating from the principle of secularism.
Secularism in India is increasingly emerging as a part of minority rights
discourse. It is seen today by most Muslims as a positive feature of Indian
life, in marked contrast to a large number of Hindus, who are today inclined
to reject secularism on the grounds that it does injustice to a Hindu histori-
cal heritage and turns ‘epistemic error into a political blunder’ (Sen,1998).
Today most of the Islamic fundamentalist organizations and other Muslim
groups in India are found actively engaged in organizing and participating
in seminar, symposia, conferences and other similar activities themselves or
jointly with other social groups for the purpose of defending the democratic
and secular structure of the Indian state against the challenges posed by the
forces of Hindutava. In a document detailing its aims and objectives, the
JIH declares that Muslims must work towards ‘safeguarding human rights,
promoting democratic values and containing the upsurge of fascism in the
country’ (Jamaet-i-Islami Hind, April 1999–March 2003: 4).
Broadly, the relationship of the Muslim community with the Indian state
can be summarized as follows. That Muslim communities seek active
support for the maintenance and development of their religious and
cultural institutions and, as such, have endorsed the state’s regulation of
many of their religious shrines (dargah), and institutions such as Wakf
Board, Hajj Committee, etc. As well as this, they have sought the help of
the state in passing legislation, such as the Kazis Act, 1880, Shariat Act, 1937,
the Punjab Music in Muslim Shrines Act, 1942 and Muslim Women (Protec-
tion of Rights on Divorce Act), 1986, that was considered vital for the
protection of Islamic identity, while remaining opposed to the state’s
reformist intervention in the field of religious and cultural sphere, or what
they considered as their personal matters. Hence, given this kind of relation-
ship between the Muslim communities and the Indian state, what is
defended is the autonomy of the community and minority cultural rights
are seen as instruments for protecting and realizing that idea (Mahajhan,
1998: 105). For this reason, the most preferred version of Article 25 by the
Islamic fundamentalist organizations/institutions is the one that construes
it as conveying an absolute right to distinct personal laws for Muslims based
on Sharia without any outside interference.
Indeed, the system of robust minority rights, including the dimension of
Indian secularism that prevails in India, has multiple advantages from the
point of view of enhancing the legitimacy of the state and integrating the
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minority communities. First, it limits the possibility of cultural assimilation
and homogenization by the nation state. Second, by providing resources
and opportunities for religious minorities to organize and mobilize, it
directly helps to redress serious inequalities among religions. It tends to
tackle the political and cultural hegemony of entrenched religious majori-
ties and of aggressive secularism. Third, it gives minority associations more
resources, based on official recognition and opportunities for participation
in the realms of information, public deliberation, decision making, and
implementation. Finally, it helps to detect hidden secularist or religious
majority bias in the distribution of material benefits and, especially, in the
cultural and symbolic impregnation of state ceremonies, rituals, and
practices.
Indian political process and Muslim communities
How far has the Indian state and democratic political process been able to
meet the constitutional commitments related to the well-being of the
minority communities, particularly the Muslim communities? How does the
dominant perception of the Muslim communities about the Indian state and
its various institutions affect their course of strategy to realize the constitu-
tional goals pertaining to them? An answer to these questions lies in under-
standing (1) the particular manner in which the Indian state system
functions and relates itself with the various social groups including the
Muslim communities, and (2) the nature of the dominant goals that have
been set before the Indian polity and pursued by the dominant sections of
Muslim elites in India. Together, they explain, to a large extent, the non-
development of Islamic militancy on a large scale among the Indian
Muslims.
The most important aspect of the functioning of the Indian state system
and the larger political process is its ambiguity to the issue of the
private–public distinction. The principle of separation of the public and
private realm has long been considered in western political discourses as a
central necessity for the maintenance of the idea of the ‘absolute neutral-
ity’ of the liberal-democratic state, as well as the idea of dissociation of the
religious and the political.15 In the Indian context, neither the constitutional
provisions nor the overall political practices of Indian state/government
point either to the separation or the fusion of the two. Thus, a reading of
Articles 15, 25(2), 26, 27, and the non-adoption of a state religion, might
suggest support for the concept of the neutrality of the state, the principle
of a public–private distinction and the separation of religion from the politi-
cal domain in the Indian setting. However, another reading of Article 27
and the ‘non-adoption of religion’ can also potentially negate the underly-
ing assumptions of the earlier version. For Article 27 does not prevent the
state from using the proceeds of taxes for the promotion of all religions, if
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not any particular religion. Neither does the absence of state religion debar,
unlike the American Constitution, the Indian state from the adoption of
religion in the future. In addition, the state can still interfere in the same
realm in order to carry out its modernist agenda of social reform.
Let me take another example of this ambiguity and vagueness in the
governing behaviour of the Indian state. The concern for equal rights for all
communities led to the recognition, even legitimization, of collective
religious worship as well as observances of religious practices in the public
realm. However, the modern sensibility of constructing a liberal-secular
state that demands the separation of religion from the political also led to
the incorporation of a provision in the Representation of Peoples Act, 1952
(further amended in 1961), that prevents the misuse of religion for corrupt
political (emphasis mine) practice.16 What constitutes the ‘misuse of
religion’ depends upon the definition of religion, which is subject to judicial
interpretation. The pattern of judicial ruling in this regard has been that
while references to a candidate’s religion or to the religion of the contender
were considered as constituting corrupt electoral practices, it has not ruled
against the general reference to religion in political campaigns (Rekhi,1993:
183–98), despite the political rhetoric of separating religion from politics
that dominates the public arena in the country. The Indian Supreme Court,
thus, did not consider use of the expression, ‘Hindutava’ in the political
campaign as violating Article 127(3) of the Representation of Peoples
Act.17 Further, since the right to profess, propagate and practise religion,
culture and language can be subjected to the regulation of state only on the
grounds of public order, decency, morality and public health, it granted
religious communities the freedom to pursue a variety of other activities in
society, including the right to mobilize and participate in politics.
What emerges from the above analysis is that the Indian Constitution
and the state has neither (totally) accepted nor rejected the principle of
private–public distinction and separation of religion from the political.
Rather, it prefers something in between: a kind of ‘relational neutrality’, as
noted before, along with the principle of ‘equidistance’ to all religions and
the equal treatment of all religions. This stands against the principle of the
‘absolute’ separation of the two; thus these governing principles provide
flexibility to maintain links with the organized religions in the service of the
nation. It seems that there were three larger considerations that influenced
the Indian political elite to evolve and adhere to the latter course without
acknowledging the same at the official level. First, there was a general
understanding of the role of religion in Indian society, wherein it was,
historically, not considered as a threat to the secular order or state, unlike
in Europe. Therefore, a general recognition of religion and culture and its
various symbols in the public arena was considered perfectly legitimate
from the governing point of view without conceding them the right to
occupy the political role.
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Second, as an agency of modernity, the political elite urgently felt the
necessity to ‘reform and regulate’ the religious institution at least in relation
to the majoritarian community, if not the minority community, without
thoroughly subjugating them to the ‘reason of state’ (Chomsky, 2003),
something that happened in the West. However the Supreme Court, by
arrogating itself the right to define what constitutes the ‘essential’ of
religion, sets the limit of the Indian state with respect to interfering in
religious affairs. Thus, in many cases, the Supreme Court upheld legislation
and executive orders to regulate the religious institutions, but in many cases
the court also struck down state laws that contravened Article 25, which
grants the ‘right to profess and practice’ religion (Mahajan, 1998: 40–79).
Thus, notwithstanding the reformist and regulatory zeal of the Indian state,
religious organizations continue to assert their autonomy in the public
sphere. Third, the state policy of equality to, and equality of, religion in the
public sphere was also designed to enhance the legitimacy of the Indian
state.
Over the years, the flexibility and ambiguity of the Indian political
process has proved to be its strength in dealing with issues of integrating
large, complex social diversities that exist in India without taking the violent
route. Commenting upon the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of secu-
larism in the Indian context, Imtiaz Ahmad has observed:
On a practical view, it would appear that leaving secularism largely undefined
and neither rejecting nor accepting the idea that the state in India would
function on the principles which had become established since the rise of
secular ideology in Europe was after all not a bad strategic choice. One positive
feature that flowed out of this deliberately left ambiguity was that it allowed
secularism to be accepted widely among the different social and religious
communities in India. Of course, the readiness for acceptance of secularism, the
speed with which it was accepted and the reasons that prompted acceptance
varied across social communities and groups. For example, secularism found
relative readiness among a large body of Hindu rights in the beginning. On the
other hand, Muslims and a few other groups were initially quite sceptical of
what secularism might entail and whether the state was actually seriously
committed to upholding it in the future. They first preferred to wait and watch.
Then they rejected it, claiming that it carried the potential to deny them a basis
for the preservation of their cultural distinctiveness and religious integrity.
Finally, they recognise the positive role of secularism and accepted it with a
view to using it to their advantage wherever possible. (Ahmad, 1999: 7–8)
One of the positive implications of the above-described ambiguous, fuzzy
and non-doctrinal nature of Indian secularism in particular, and the larger
political process in general, is that that minorities, especially Muslims,
continue to enjoy the recognition of their religious and cultural symbols in
the public realm as part of the evolved political culture. This is reflected in
the observance of national public holidays connected with minority
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religions. Thus, out of 14 declared national religious holidays, 10 belong to
minority communities (four Muslim, two Christian, two Sikh, one Buddhist,
and one Jain). It is a general practice that the Qur’an and Bible are recited
along with the Hindu scriptures during national mourning and on other
occasions. Of late, throwing an iftar (breaking of the day fast) party by the
members of the political class (including the President and Prime Minister)
has become a political norm. Interestingly, the public exchequer partly
meets the expenses of these parties. Similarly, the government provides
subsidies for, and makes elaborate arrangements to facilitate, Muslims’ trips
to Mecca (Saudi Arabia) to perform Haj. Further, the benefit of Censorship
laws has also been liberally extended to the Muslim communities. Among
the books (related to Islam and Muslim Communities) so proscribed in
India are Thomas and Thomas on the Prophet, Kurt Frishler on his wife
Syeda Aisah, Desmond Steward and Ram Swarup on Islamic religion
(Mahmood, 1993: 107) and Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses banned in 1956,
1963, 1975, 1983 and 1988 respectively. The proliferation of madrassas18 in
post-colonial India (Krishna, 1985: 377; Sikand, 2005: 94–100) is another
indicator of liberal political culture in India.
The underlying thrust of the above narration is that the combination of
the nature of Indian secularism, the Indian state’s responsiveness to the
issue of cultural and religious sensibilities, and the system of minority rights
including the Muslim Personal Law, provides the institutionalized space for
Indian Muslim communities to live in accordance with their religion, culture
and identity and to assert their symbols in the public arena without any fear.
Tahir Mahmood discovered how the operation of public law in India does
not contradict the percept of Islam, nor does it obstruct Muslims in organ-
izing their life in accordance with Islamic values (Mahmood, 1993: 93–120).
Reflecting on the advantage of the System of Personal Law in India, John
Mansfield argues that ‘[i]n particular it contributes to their sense of existing
and having meaning, something that citizenship in a nation-state alone
cannot confer’ (Mansfield, 1993: 158). In similar vein, but in a wider frame-
work of minority rights, Bishnu Mohapatra also argues that the recognition
of ascriptive identities of the people in a substantive sense contributes to a
better realization of equal citizenship and increases people’s sense of
belonging to the political communities in which they live (Mohapatra, 2002:
169–92).
Connected with the ambiguity of the doctrine of secularism, there is
another crucial feature of the Indian political process that helps in protect-
ing the interests of minority/Muslim communities. This refers to the lack of
development of ‘majoritarianism’ as a political creed and as a basis of
governance. Both the internal structure of the Constitution and the social
diversities of Indian society greatly constrain the possibility of the emer-
gence of majoritarianism, if not the development of majoritarian politics.
Majoritarianism is a fixed and relentless position, which is incapable of
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alteration, whereas a majority rule is open to transformation and change.
The fact that a political decision in a (majoritarian) democracy is democra-
tically arrived at leaves open the option of further representations and the
possibility of a reversal of the earlier decision. As the majority opinion
keeps changing in the public sphere, what is a majority view today could be
a minority view tomorrow. It is through this process that minorities, includ-
ing women, have succeeded in getting their due rights in the democratic
societies of the world. Any student of the social transformation of Indian
society in the post-colonial period will testify to the gradual upward
mobility of hitherto excluded social groups of lower caste/class in the higher
echelons of state administration and other areas, without any large-scale
violent backlash.
Needless to say, majoritarianism should be distinguished from the
various shades of majority rule that are constantly under democratic
pressure to change. The ‘politics of majoritarianism’ is one thing; its trans-
formation into a ‘creed of majoritarianism’ is another. In fact, the alarmist
view that was generated in certain liberal quarters on this account follow-
ing the rise of the Hindu Right was found to be exaggerated, if not
completely false. The Bharitya Janata Party (BJP), the party of the Hindu
Right, during its rule (1997–2004) miserably failed to implement its core
agenda of majoritarianism, which was instrumental in bringing it to power.
The most important among these were the construction of the Ram Temple,
adoption of the Uniform Civil Code, scrapping of Article 370, which gives
special status to Jammu and Kashmir, and the abolition of National
Commission of Minority Rights, set up by the previous government. While
the BJP put the failure down to coalition rule, it was actually the constitu-
tional propriety that became the main obstacle in implementing its agenda
(Bhargav, 2002). It even failed to push a nation-wide ban on cow-slaughter,
in spite of it being a central symbol of Hindu politics during India’s pre-
and post-independence phase (Freitag,1990, Chapters 5 and 6).
This inbuilt elasticity of the Indian political process has largely helped
Muslims to realize their dominant goals through mainstream secular
political parties, chiefly the Indian National Congress, and Congress (I),
following its split in 1969. The dominant goal of ‘Muslim politics’ (Alam,
2003; Eicklman, 1996) since the decline of Muslim power in India has been
the protection of the religious and cultural identity of the community
(Alam,1995: 107; Alam, 2002; Krishna, 1985: 365–403; Madan, 1997,
106–49). It is in conjunction with this goal that the dominant Islamic/
Muslim representation of post-colonial India and the Indian state is one of
dar-ul-ahd (land of pact), derived from Prophet Muhammad’s pact (ahad)
with the Jews of Medina after his hijra (migration) or dar-ul-aman (state at
peace with Islam). According to this thesis, Muslims and non-Muslims have
entered into a mutual contract in India since independence to establish a
secular state under which Muslims would be free to exercise their religious
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obligations, at least in the personal sphere (Mahmood, 1993; Shabuddin and
Wright, 1987: 157; Smith, 1957: 285; Troll, 1995: 245–61).
Thus the few demands that have agitated ‘Muslim minds’ in post-inde-
pendent India are the protection of the Muslim Personal Law, the
promotion of Urdu, the preservation of the minority character of Aligarh
Muslim University, the construction of the Babri mosque, the protection of
mosques, shrines, madarassas, etc. The attitude of various central and state
governments towards these demands has neither been ‘outright rejection’
nor ‘total acceptance’, but ‘a gradual concession’ to the community, depend-
ing upon the ‘context’ and ‘political weight’. This is reflected in many major
government initiatives: from grants to minority educational institutions to
giving ‘minority status’ to various Muslim educational institutions;19 extend-
ing to Muslims the benefit of affirmative policy in the opportunity structure
of the state;20 the inclusion of Urdu in the Constitution’s eighth schedule;21
the declaration of Urdu as the second official language in many states;22 the
setting up the National Council for Promotion of Urdu Language Board
(1996); the setting up the Maulana Azad National Urdu Central University
(1998); the Protection Of Religious Place of Worship Act, 1992; the Muslim
Women Protection of Right on Divorce Act, 1989; the Prevention of
Terrorism (Repeal) Ordinance, 2004; setting up various commissions to
look into the grievances of Muslims;23 the National Minority Development
and Financial Corporation, 1992; the setting up the National Commission
for Minority Rights (1978), reconstituted as the National Commission for
Minorities (1992); and the passing of the National Commission for Minority
Educational Institutions Bill, 2004.
In addition to the above measures, the government and ruling parties
ensure the representation of Muslims in decision-making bodies through
ensuring nomination of members of minority communities to elective
offices and partly through their promotion to positions of power and
authority in government. Whether this has in fact ensured that the minori-
ties are able to affect political decisions remains an open question.
However, this political practice has given to the minorities a sense of
representation and participation in the decision-making process.
The purpose of listing the above major governmental measures and
political outcomes is not to ‘gauge’ the overall impact upon the Muslim
communities from a developmental point of view,24 but to underline the fact
that these measures partly meet the political and economic needs of the
Muslim elite, if not all. More importantly, it recognizes their symbolic values,
which, along with the general recognition of minority rights and its cultural
and religious symbols in the public arena, goes a long way in stemming
the tide of growing isolation, apathy and alienation among the Muslim
communities, as well as helping in the restoration of their ‘wounded’
confidence in the Indian state system. Sita Ram Kesari, the then Welfare
Minister, when putting the National Commission for Minorities Bill to the
ETHNICITIES 7(1)50
51
floor in parliament for vote on 5 May 1992, remarked, ‘. . . armed with a
statutory power, the Commission would be an effective instrument for protec-
tion of minority rights and it would instil confidence in the minorities’.25
Recently, an overall decline of political secularism and a related rise in
communal riots have resulted in a growing sense of insecurity among Indian
Muslims and a distrust in state agencies. However, Muslims still don’t view
the Indian state as decisively working against Islam or their communal
interests. In other words, the state has not lost total legitimacy in the eyes
of Muslims, it is not perceived as the ‘enemy’ of Islam and Muslims per se.
There are two indicators that confirm this observation. First, despite the
demolition of the Babri masjid (1992) and the Gujrat Carnage (2003), the
Islamic doctrine of Jahilliya – first conceived by the late Maulana Abu-
Ala-Maudidi, founder of Jamait-e-Islami in undivided India, and later
popularized by the late Sayyid Qutub, ideologue of the Muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt – which demands the creation of a worldwide Islamic state
by all means, including violent ones, has not gained legitimacy among Indian
Muslims, unlike in other Muslim-populated regions, including western
Europe. Second, if one believes a survey conducted in 1996 on the accep-
tance of the democratic and secular political system among the different
religious groups in India, the most vocal support came from the Muslims
(72.2%) compared to 68.2 percent among the Hindus (Mitra, 2001: 26). The
same trend among Muslims was also confirmed by the Centre for Studies
on Developing Countries (CSDS). According to the CSDS’s State of the
Nation Survey in 2005, which involved 28 states of the country, 98 percent
of the Muslims identified themselves as Indian compared to 97 percent of
Hindus and 76 percent of Muslims as against 78 percent of Hindus stated
that democracy is always better (Hindustan Times, 2006).
CONCLUSION
In concluding, I would like to recapture the main arguments underlying this
article. The article begins with a clarification of the meaning of fundamen-
talism and reflects upon the non-violent dimensions of major Islamic funda-
mentalist organizations in India, despite internal and external conditions
that favour violence. The article offers a perspective that takes into
consideration the interplay of the Indian nation-building process, the
system of minority rights, the doctrine of secularism and the larger demo-
cratic political process, to explain the absence of large-scale Islamic
militancy in India.
The emerging analysis is that there are at least three specific reasons that
might explain the absence of large-scale violent response by either funda-
mentalist Islamic groups or Muslim masses in general. First, by recognizing
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their religious and cultural symbols in the public arena and by maintaining
the policy of non-interference in their internal matters, the Indian state meets
the religio-cultural demands of Muslims, including Islamic fundamentalist
groups. Zoya Hasan has critically noted, however, how the state and the
political process in India thus help in constructing a ‘unified, monolithic
identity’ of Islam and Muslim communities – one that conforms to the vision
of Islamic fundamentalist groups and puts Indian Muslim women in a dis-
advantageous position at the cost of the constitutional value of gender
equality (Hasan,1994: 59–73). Second, it is hard to establish that the majority
of Muslims actually blame the Indian state and government for their relative
material deprivation,notwithstanding the political rhetoric that exists on this
account. The perception that Muslims are becoming victims of the Indian
state’s ‘politics of exclusion’ lacks empirical validity. Rather, affirmative
polices by state and central governments have benefited Muslims at the
lower strata. Further,India’s elitist model of development has mostly met the
aspirations of elites among different social groups, including Muslims.
Finally, the democratic political process in the country provides ample
opportunity for Muslims to renegotiate their demands, depending upon the
political context. It is this flexibility of the Indian democratic process and
the incremental political outcomes (some of which have been listed above)
that predispose the dominant Muslim elites and Islamic/Muslim organiz-
ations, including the fundamentalist groups, to realize their goals through
constitutional means, instead of opting for violent means.
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Notes
1 According to the 2001 census, there are roughly 140 million Muslims, amounting
to 12.4 percent of the entire Indian population. Almost half of Indian Muslims
are concentrated in the northern states, while the rest are fairly evenly distrib-
uted between the other parts of the country. The vast majority of Indian Muslims
are Sunni, but roughly 10 percent count themselves as Shiites. While in popular
perception, Indian Muslims are considered a ‘monolithic community’, in reality
they are constituted by a wide array of regional, linguistic, economic, sectarian,
doctrinal and caste differences (Ahmad, 1978; Momin, 2004).
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2 However, for Madan, it is the ‘element of political power’ that distinguishes
fundamentalism from orthodoxy (Madan, 1997: 106–49). For me, there is a very
thin line of demaraction between orthodoxy and fundamentalism and both are
interrelated to each other. The transformation of Shiism from its orthodox
quietist tendency to the usurper of state power in the contemporary Iranian
context, or the develoment of Wahabbism from an orthodox social movement
to a partner of state power in the Saudi context, or the political assertion of
Brahaminical Hinduism and Sinhala Buddhism in the Indian and Sri Lankan
contexts respectively, does highlight the inherent power-potential of organized
religion. Their varied specific positions – whether orthodoxy, conservatism or
fundamentalism – are often shaped by the changing nature of the state–society
relationship within which they are located.
3 It corresponds roughly to the period of 30 years between AD 631 and 661, which
is considered the golden period of Islam by all shades of Islamic and Muslim
groups.
4 There are varied interpretations of these Islamic doctrines, depending upon
the particular school and discipline. The literal meanings of these terms are as
follows: Sharia – divine law, Jihad – to strive in right path, Jahilliya – pre-
Islamic age of ignorance, Dawa – to invite towards Islam, and Umma –
religious unity of Muslims in the world. However, in the hands of Islamic
fundamentalist groups, these terms have acquired the status of the identity of
Islam itself.
5 Among all these organizations, JIH figures most prominently in the literature
as the representative of Political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia.
However, I consider all these organizations as a part of ‘religious fundamental-
ism’, for despite the internal differences that exist among themselves, they are
wedded to the ‘fundamentalist vision of Islam’ as defined in the article. Second,
all fundamentalist organizations – whether religious or secular – retain the
inherent capacity to degenerate into terrorist outfits, depending upon the nature
of their evolution and the political context, if not vice-versa. For instance, al
Jamma-al Islamiyya in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine, and organizations such as
Hizbul Mujehaddin, Laskar-Tyabe in Jammu and Kashmir, had their ideological
schooling in their parent organization, Muslim Brotherhood and JIH respec-
tively. Other examples from secular organizations can also be cited – for
example, LTTE (Liberation Tiger of Tamil Ealam) in Sri Lanka and many
Maoist outfits in India.
6 This case relates to a woman called Shaha Bano, who was divorced by her
husband in her old age. The matter reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court, while interpreting the sacred texts of the Qur’an and Hadith, endorsed
the earlier High Court decree that Shaha Bano had the right to future mainten-
ance from her former husband under section 125 of the Indian Code Criminal
Procedure. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board and other Islamic funda-
mentalist organizations raised the issue that a secular institution did not have a
right to interpret the Qur’an and the Hadith and hence the court judgment
amounted to interference in the matters of personal law that has been sanc-
tioned by the Indian Constitution to the Muslim communities. The movement
became so powerful that it forced the then Rajiv Gandhi government to annul
the Supreme Court judgment by passing a retrogressive law, the Muslim Women
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(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. On the implication of the Shaha
Bano case for national politics in India, see, Das, 1997.
7 Madrassas was/is an institution of learning in Muslim societies, including India,
which was/is being gradually transformed into an institution of ‘Islamic’
learning and an object of Islamic culture and identity.
8 The preamble of the Indian Constution calls India a ‘secular [added by the 42nd
constitutional amendment, 1976], Socialist, Democratic Republic’ and aims to
secure equality, liberty and justice. However, these are not enforceable values
but mere guidelines to the interpretation of the constitution and the state’s
action. Though the Supreme Court of India has declared secularism, federalism,
parliamentary form of government, and judicial review as the basic structure of
the Indian constitution, these do not constitute the core values of the Indian
nation but are the principles of governance and, as such, limit state action. In
fact, there has never been an occasion where the governments at state level or
central level have refused to negotiate with the group’s demands on the grounds
that it violates the very ‘national identity’ as mentioned in the preamble of the
constitution or the basic structure of the constitution. In the same manner, the
doctrines of ‘composite culture’ or ‘composite nationalism’ are at best ‘ideologi-
cal constructs’ needed for the nation-building process, but are not the fixed
attributes of Indian national identity.
9 These ‘cultural rights’ of minority communities are the product of ‘difficult
negotiations’ that were carried out during the process of constitution making.
There are many who believe that these minority rights were a ‘political conces-
sion’ made to the Muslim communities for giving up their claims to the principle
of a separate electorate, which was granted to them under the British Raj, in
favour of a mixed electorate. There may be a grain of truth in this way of looking
at the provision of minority rights but their incorporation within the consti-
tution also underlies the recognition of their participation in the anti-colonial
struggle nationwide (Gupta, 2000:138.)
10 In accordance with this article, Urdu, the language of the Muslim ashraf (upper
caste/class) has now been transformed into a marker of Muslim/Islamic identity
in India. It has also been declared as second official languages in parts of the
states of Bihar, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and in Delhi. It is the official
language of Jammu and Kashmir.
11 The case of Kerala Education Bill, 1957, quoted in Massey,1999: 42.
12 The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and the Hindu Adoptions and Mainten-
ance Act, 1956
13 A prominent member of the ConstituentAssembly,K.T. Shah, tried, through two
amendments to the Draft Constitution, to have India declared a secular state,
specifying that it would have nothing to do with any religion, creed or faith.
According to the first of these amendments India, would have been described as
a ‘Secular Federal Socialist Union of States’. Dr B. Ambedkar, Chairman of the
Drafting Committee of the Constitution, rejected both amendments on the
grounds that it was not advisable to prescribe a particular form of social organiz-
ation for future generations. On another occasion,he denied that the Indian state
was secular because he wanted it to have the right of intervention in religious
matters in the same manner as in secular affairs (see Madan, 1997: 243).
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14 In an Indian context, the term ‘communal’ refers to a conception of religious
communities as constituting homogenous collectives with distinctive histories,
while ‘communal riots’ refers to predominantly Hindu–Muslim conflict.
Instances of this conflict have been a recurrent phenomenon since indepen-
dence, with marked increases during 1980s and 1990s (Engineer,1984, 2002).
Invariably, Muslims suffer most in this conflict.
15 In recent years, the public–private debate has again resurfaced in the West,
particularly in western Europe, with respect to the issue of the integration of
Muslim immigrant communities. Critics, mostly from the side of advocates of
multiculturalism and feminism, have argued that the ideal of a public–private
distinction is at best a theoretical myth and points out how the façade of the
neutrality of the public realm essentially privileges/protects the culture, norms
and interests of the dominant social group by excluding the concerns of the
marginalized and subordinated groups. Therefore, they advocate the moderate
interpretation of this distinction and argue that the positive inclusion of
religious groups in the public sphere will help in integrating the non-European
immigrant communities, particularly the Muslims (Modood, 2005: 131–70).
16 Article 127(3) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1952, as enacted, defined
‘corrupt practice’ as: ‘The systematic appeal by a candidate or his agent or by
any other person, to vote or refrain from voting on grounds of . . . religion or
the use of, or appeal to, religious symbols . . . for the furtherance of the prospects
of that candidate’s election.’ In 1961, it was amended to read as follows: “The
appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with consent of a
candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on
the ground of his religion . . . or the use or appeal to religious symbols . . . for
the furtherance of the prospects of election of that candidate or for prejudicially
affecting the election of any candidate (Rekhi, 1993: 182, fn 17).
17 Ramesh Yashwant Prabhoo (Dr) vs. Prabhakar K. Kunte (1996) 1SCC 130,
Manhoar Joshi vs. Nitin Bhau Rao Patil (1996) 1SCC 169, Ramchandra K.
Kapse vs. Haribansh R. Singh (1996), 1 SCC 206.
18 As to the existing number of the madrassas in India, there is no reliable
estimate. However, it is widely believed that the number of madrassas in post-
colonial India has quadrupled in comparison with pre-independence. Thus,
according to the Centre for the Promotion of Science at the Aligarh Muslim
University, in 1985 there were 2890 madrassas in the country. A decade later,
the Union Minister for Human Resource Development put the figure at 12,000.
In 2002, the Union Minister for Home claimed that the number stood at 31,857.
In 2003, a leading Muslim paper claimed that there were some 125,000
madrassas in India, catering for around 30,000 students and with a combined
annual budget of approximately 14 billion rupees (figures quoted from Sikand,
2005: 95).
19 A certification of minority status allows the minority education institution to
reserve up to 50 percent of total seats for students belonging to their co-religion.
20 Muslims groups now receive the benefit of reserved quotas in the states of
Kerela, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. In Kerela, 12
percent of jobs are currently reserved for Muslims. Karnataka and Andhra
Pradesh brought in 4 percent and 5 percent reservation for Muslims in 1994 and
2005 respectively. In Tamil Nadu and Bihar, Muslims are entitled to reservation
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under the 30 percent and 17 percent category earmarked for Other Backward
Class (OBC). In addition to this, some 80 lower caste Muslim groups enjoy the
benefit of a 27 percent quota in central government services and educational
institutions, as per the Mandal Commission Recommendation of 1990.
21 Among the other benefits, the declaration of a language as a ‘schedule language’
allows students to write examinations for national government services in any
one of the 22 language listed under the 8th schedule.
22 The importance of second official language status lies in the fact that all govern-
ment notifications and orders will also be made available in this language as well
as the official language. This creates employment opportunities in terms of
appointment of translators in all the departments of the government, as well as
the appointment of teachers in the public schools. Urdu has been declared as a
second language in the 15 and 13 districts of the state of Bihar and Andhra
Pradesh respectively. In the state of Utter Pradesh, Urdu was declared as second
language in the western parts of the state in the early 1980s through an
ordinance that subsequently lapsed. In certain parts of Karnataka, Urdu enjoys
the status of second official language. More recently, the government of Delhi
has declared Urdu, along with the Gurumukhi (the language of the Punjabi
community), as the second official language.
23 Congress Committee Report, 1957, the Gujral Committee Report, 1983, The
Gopal Singh Panel Report, 1983 and the Prime Minister’s High Level
Committee For Preparation of Report on Social, Economic and Educational
Status of the Muslim Community of India, 2005.
24 This subject is outside the scope of this article. Suffice to say, the impact of
these governmental measures and the political process varies in accordance
with the variation among the Muslim communities. Thus in the southern
peninsula, where Muslims constitute a vibrant middle class, they have effec-
tively used the minority rights and the governmental welfare measures related
to minorities, and built the community assets in terms of educational insti-
tutions, banking services and others. In contrast, the absence of a strong middle
class among the Muslims in northern India was a crucial factor in its failure to
realize the same goals as achieved in the south. Given their relative educational
and economic backwardness, combined with the threat of inter-communal
conflicts, the Muslims in north India suffer from a greater degree of isolation,
alienation, apathy and sense of discrimination than among the Muslims in the
South.
25 Lok Sabha Debate, 11 May 1992, quoted in Mohapatra, 2002.
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